


~~SECRET~~

DDTR  
11

25X1A

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9



10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Director of the Office of Training at CIA, which ~~indeed~~  
~~does~~ conduct<sup>s</sup> training courses for intelligence analysts, and  
we feel that the training conducted in those courses is  
applicable for indications analysis as<sup>(WILL AS)</sup> for other types of  
intelligence analysis. And I think the statement that is  
underlined on page 6 of your report points this out very  
nicely.

We offer three different intelligence analysis courses/  
and that is<sup>an</sup> specifically for analysts, although there are other  
training<sup>a third by</sup> courses for analysts as well. In these courses we  
try to cover the very things that I have heard you talking  
to the Defense representatives here today. For example, we  
cover such things as methodologies that are available to and  
help clarify analysis, and in fact<sup>(1)</sup> we have one very interesting  
exercise which~~is also~~ run on a computer, a PDP-1145, which  
is based upon ~~Batesian~~<sup>Bayesian</sup> analysis, which is an effort to teach

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100170002-8  
 1 people to change the values of their predictions based upon  
 2 receipt of successive data. This is, <sup>desire to overcome the tendency for</sup> something that analysts --  
 3 and I am an old intelligence analyst and know ~~that you tend~~  
 4 to hang on to the hypothesis that <sup>they</sup> you start out with, and  
 5 as you get new data, <sup>they</sup> you <sup>NOT to</sup> ~~don't~~ <sup>that</sup> change your hypothesis. Well,  
 6 this is an attempt to teach people how to do that.

7 Another area that we teach ~~them in~~ is what is called  
 8 subjective probability assessment, to sharpen up their judg-  
 9 ments. If I could explain it like this, they are asked to  
 10 make judgments ~~about~~ -- and this is in exercises <sup>(USING)</sup> factual  
 11 statements or predictions, <sup>the</sup> and to place a probability upon the  
 12 likelihood of these things, and then having done so, to give  
 13 an indication of the confidence that they have in their own  
 14 judgment. And you can train <sup>g</sup> people through this technique  
 15 to improve their judgments and ~~in effect upon~~ the confidence  
 16 <sup>making them</sup> that they have ~~in it~~, and to do a little bit better job of  
 17 doing that and in communicating it to the people that use the  
 18 intelligence product, ~~that stems from this.~~

19 Finally, in this area, we have worked on the question of  
 20 bias, <sup>ING</sup> addressed the question of institutional bias which is  
 21 pretty easily identified, unit bias, <sup>as</sup> different parts of  
 22 organizations have different biases, but above all, the really  
 23 difficult one is the bias that resides in each individual. It  
 24 is harder to identify and it is harder to do something about  
 25 because it is based upon that person's background and  
 Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100170002-8

SECRET

1 experiences, perhaps cognitive bias, you might say.

2 And finally, one of the kinds of things that we do in  
3 these programs -- we have three different courses here -- is  
4 in the area of creativity, of helping <sup>analysts</sup> ~~them~~ <sup>identify</sup> ~~to think up~~ new  
5 hypotheses <sup>than</sup> ~~to address that~~. In that connection we have got

6  
7  
8  
9  
10 of what makes people think creatively, and they have been very  
11 cooperative with us and have given us the benefit of a lot  
12 of their research and of training programs that they have  
13 conducted.

14 We originally sent people down there for training, and  
15 subsequently, one of their principal training programs was  
16 transferred in-house and is conducted now at CIA six times a  
17 year with the assistance of these people.

18 We have three different courses for different levels of  
19 people. These are all intelligence analysis course<sup>s</sup>, and they  
20 vary in length from two weeks to four weeks, and the numbers  
21 <sup>OF STUDENTS RUN FROM</sup> ~~vary around~~ 15 to 20. We have a total capacity of training <sup>(in this area)</sup> for  
22 about 300 people a year. We do not train <sup>s</sup>pecifically, as the  
23 ~~little~~ statement said, in indications and warning, and we do send  
24 people over to Captain [REDACTED] <sup>but</sup> course at the Defense Intelligence

25X1A

25X1A

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100170002-8

14

1 Mr. Rose. Do all analysts at the CIA benefit from these  
2 course?  
3

25X1A

3 [REDACTED] Not all analysts have taken the courses,  
4 particularly people who have been around for a while. Some of  
5 these are fairly new programs that have not been under way for  
6 a long time. I guess we would like to think <sup>(that, as)</sup> we are doing <sup>this</sup> the  
7 training, ~~that~~ <sup>rather</sup> if they take them, they would certainly benefit  
8 from them.

9 I think we start from the point of view that we expect  
10 people to be able to analyze and to think when they are hired.  
11 That is one of the things that we don't expect to have to teach  
12 them after they get there.

13 Mr. Rose. How do you <sup>5</sup>text them to make sure that they can  
14 do that when you hire them?

25X1A

15 [REDACTED] Well, there's a variety of ways. One is we  
16 do give a variety of psychological tests to them in the first  
17 place to establish their IQ. I am not an expert on this, sir,  
18 and I can't go into it in great depth. We do a lot of inter-  
19 viewing of them at that time by people who are experienced in  
20 ~~this field~~ <sup>the intelligence</sup>. We would not rely on test batteries by themselves.  
21 And we obviously look at their previous experience, education,  
22 academic transcripts, and above all, <sup>(WE)</sup> contact ~~with~~ the people ~~that~~  
23 they have worked for or in their communities. I think ~~is~~ of  
24 interest to us, <sup>-- these</sup> contact, <sup>So we can get a</sup> basically looking at their background

25 Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100170002-8 of, and that

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100170002-8

**Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100170002-8

Approved For Release 2001/11/23 : CIA-RDP81-00896R000100170002-8  
Mr. Rose. You said you have three courses?

25X1A

Yes, sir.

Mr. Rose. What are the titles of those courses? Do you have them?

25X1A

Yes, indeed. Seminar on Intelligence

Analysis, which runs four times each year for three weeks, Introduction to Analysis for Career Trainees -- those are entry level people -- which ~~is run~~ <sup>the third is</sup> it is two weeks and ~~it is~~ run four times a year. We ~~have~~ something called the Intelligence Process Course, which is conducted twice a year, four weeks in length.

Mr. Rose. Does the Intelligence Process Course, which teaches analysts to make finished intelligence meaningful to executive-level policy makers, does it deal specifically with warning?

25X1A

Yes, but only in a very short fashion. There is not much coverage on warning in it.

Mr. Rose. The National Intelligence Daily, which serves a high-level audience, could be considered to have a warning function. Are the articles in the NID evaluated for their predictive accuracy?

25X1A I had better come up to the table.

Mr. Rose. Come on.

25X1A

No, sir, they are not. We ran an experiment in this, not with the NID because it didn't exist at the

SECRET

1 time, but with its predecessor, the National Intelligence  
2 Bulletin, and we found that it was not a fruitful exercise,  
3 that you ran into too many the-sun-will-rise-tomorrow predic-  
4 tions. If the analysts knew we were grading them on this, we  
5 would run into a great many more of them, and there were any  
6 number of pitfalls in it that made the statistics that we  
7 came up with quite meaningless.

8 Mr. Rose. Some procedures have been developed to  
9 reduce or compensate for the effects of perceptual bias in  
10 human mental processes, as you mentioned. For example,  
11 repetitive training with constant feedback allows airline  
12 pilots to compensate for illusions such as things appearing  
13 to be closer on clear days than on hazy days.

14 Does the CIA provide any training to its analysts which  
15 will actually help them overcome cognitive biases?

16 [REDACTED]. I referred a moment ago, sir, to two exercises  
17 which are done <sup>in real time</sup> real live, at, say, a computer terminal keyboard,  
18 which provides instant feedback. One of those exercises is  
19 this business of adjusting one's hypothesis based upon the  
20 receipt of new data. It is based on Bayes' work, or Bayesian  
21 algebra. The other is a subjective probability test where one  
22 is able to get instant feedback.

23 I think these are in that general ballpark. I think they  
24 are very limited and they may be somewhat primitive, but I do  
25 think that this is apropos as far as intelligence analysis

25X1A

SECRET

1 work is concerned.

2 Mr. Rose. All right, thank you very much.

3 (Whereupon, at 3:14 o'clock p.m., the Subcommittee  
4 proceeded to the consideration of other matters.)

5 - - -